Like may Iranian social scientists I am following the political developments ahead of the June 18 presidential election. In this blog I reflect on these as we get closer to the election day. One key factor to keep in mind is that many candidates were disqualified by the Guardian council and the seven candidates that were approved for participation were selected in such a way that the preferred candidate, Iran's Chief Justice Ebrahim Raisi can win the election.
June 7th, 2021: The first debate among presidential candidates took place two days ago and it revealed a similar pattern that has been observed in previous elections. Since most people are unhappy and alienated from the ruling theocratic regime, they tend to vote for the candidate that criticizes the current economic hardships and government's failures. This counter established position helped Mohammed Khatami win the presidency in 1997, and Ahmadinejad in 2005. In the June 5th debate most candidates focused on blaming the economic policies and incompetence of the Rouhani administration. They were however, limited in what they could say because of the Islamic regime's redlines. No one mentioned the economic sanctions or Iran's confrontational foreign policy as key causes of the current economic conditions. Not only the more recent economic sanctions are a direct result of Iran's regional policy but the Islamic regime also spends billions of dollars in support of Hizbollah, Hamas and other proxy military operations in the Middle East.
The 2021 election is different from the previous elections because a large number of people are likely to boycott the elections altogether. This means that the people who will vote are either devoted supporters of the regime or the individuals who are afraid of facing punishment if they don't vote. (In Iran a citizen's birth certificate is stamped to show that he or she has voted. The government will also have a digital record of who has participated.) There are therefore some voters who are deeply unhappy about the core policies of the regime and will vote out of fear. Two candidates, Abdolnasser Hemmati and Mohsen Mehralizadeh are trying to gain the votes of this group by presenting themselves as the voices of the unrepresented and excluded citizens. If one of them manages to attract enough votes he might pose a serious challenge to the favorite candidate, Ebrahim Raisi.
Another important development that deserves attention is the recent voices of descent among the prominent clerics that have objected to the vetting process and disqualification of many candidates. One of them is the grandson of the founder of Islamic Republic, Ayatolah Ruhollah Khomeini. The second one is Ayatollah Mahmoud Amjad who has been a vocal critic of Khamenei in recent years. Both of them have called for the boycott of the June 18 election. A sharp attack by the Hassan Khomeini was unexpected and it can discourage some conservative religious Iranians from participation in the election. The participation rate in this election has become a very sensitive political issue for the ruling Islamic regime in this recent weeks as it will be viewed by many as a measure of the regime's popular legitimacy.
June 12th, 2021: In an unprecedented move various opposition groups and personalities inside and outside of Iran organized an online gathering to announce the creation of a unified opposition coalition. Their fist coordinated political campaign was centered around the upcoming June 18th Presidential elections. The presence of Reza Pahlavi (the crown prince of the deposed Pahlavi dynasty,) in this group gave it credibility because of his popularity among large groups of Iranians. The opposition groups have been ineffective and often have been at odds with one another. This time however, they seem to have found a common ground in the "Say no to Elections" campaign.
In a related development the daughter of former president Hashemi Rafsanjani joined several other regime insiders that have called for the boycott of the elections. Both supporters and opponents of the ruling regime are fully aware of the significance of the turnout in this election. A very low turnout will send a strong signal of no confidence to the ruling regime. This by itself will not change the current political equilibrium but it can trigger other political developments and protests after the election with uncertain effects. It will also weaken the ruling regimes credibility in the international community.
In the meantime the third and final presidential debate is organized for today June 12th. This round will focus on foreign policy topics. All participants are expected to exercise self-censorship and respect the red lines of the top leadership. The elected president has very little control on key issues and parameters of Iran's foreign policy.
June 13, 2021: Economic Agenda of the Candidates and Its Relevance. The most important challenge for majority of Iranians is the harsh economic conditions. The economy has suffered many setbacks as a result of the external economic sanctions and domestic policy mismanagement. As expected the candidates are well aware of the declining living standards, high unemployment and unprecedented inflation rate. Iran's harsh economic conditions are a result of the ideological and geopolitical priorities of the Supreme leader and his core supporters. The elected president has very limited control on my of these factors and as a result he will not be able to improve the economy with the Policy cy tools that are at his disposal.
It is no wonder that economic experts and ordinary people alike are ignoring the economic agenda of the candidates during the debates. The candidates themselves have not offered any detailed and realistic economic plans and instead have promised major changes such as reducing the inflation to under 10 percent which will be very unlikely as long as the economic sanctions are in effect and foreign policy tensions continue. The main reason for the high inflation rates is the sharp increase in money supply. Since the sanctions have sharply reduced Iran's oil revenues the government has no alternative other than financed its large budget deficit by borrowing large sums from the Central Bank. This in turn, will increase the money supply and cause high inflation rates.
In reaction to the campaign to sanction the presidential election the domestic media have moved from denial of this campaign to publishing reports and asking ordinary citizens if they are going to boycott the presidential elections. Some articles are acknowledging that some citizens might not vote and then most are trying to convince the readers to vote.
June 14, 2021: Only four days are left before the elections on June 18 and so far none of the seventh candidates has dropped out of the race. The regime favorite Ebrahim Raisi is facing a growing competition from the centrist candidate Abdulnaser Hemmati. Hemmati has gained popularity by being critical of the regime and its hardline positions. By doing so it s appealing to many unhappy voters whose favorite candidates were disqualified. The most important political development of the last two days, however, was a shocking statement by former President Ahmadinejad's Intelligence Minister, Haydar Moslehi, about why former President Rafsanjani was disqualified for the 2013 presidential elections. Moslehi argued that since election surveys revealed that Rafsanjani would have won the election with a landslide, he convinced the Guardian Council to disqualify him. His reason for this recommendation was that As a popular president with a landslide victory Rafsanjani might have defied the Supreme Leader and posed a risk to the entire Islamic regime (Nezam). This revelation have shocked the public and the ruling elite alike and some have requested that the Guardian Council clarify the authenticity of this claim.
Moslehi's comments demonstrate that the Guardian Council's standards for rejections of candidates are complex and are influenced more by the regime's political interests than the personal character and qualifications of individual candidates. This revelation is likely to cause more division and alienate more regime supporters. Rafsanjani remains popular among supporters of the regime as a pragmatic leader that focused on reduction of external tensions and economic reform during his eight-year presidency in 1990s.
June 17, 2021: Ayatolah Khamenei and his conservative supporters that would like to see Ebrahim Raisi win the Presidential election are facing a very crucial dilemma at we get closer to the election. One of the candidates , Abdolnasser Hemmati, has presented himself as the opposition candidate to Raisi. He has advocated for the moderate social and cultural policies that reformists have demanded and as a result he is considered an implicit reformist candidate. (All the moderate and reformist candidates were disqualified. ) As a result he has attracted a significant amount of attention.)
At the same a unique feature of this round of presidential elections is that because of unprecedented disqualification of candidates many people and political activists have joined a campaign to boycott the elections. The supreme leader Khamenei and his supporters have launched a campaign to encourage people to participate because they fear the a low turnout will undermine the legitimacy of the riling Islamic regime.
So what is the dilemma? Iranians that do not support Khamenei and his hardline faction have been divided into two groups. One group have called for the boycott. The second group have called for participation to support Hemmati. From the point of view of Ayatollah Khamenei both of these actions are undesirable. If a large number of people boycott the elections, the small group that vote will support Raisi and he will be elected. But the low turn out will undermine the legitimacy of the regime. On the other hand, if they participate to support Hemmati, the turnout will be high but there is a risk that Raisi will lose.
Of course it is very likely that if Hemmati receives a large number of votes, He and Raisi will have to compete in a run off election. However, in such an election it is very likely that the turnout will be high and Hemmati will win. A hematite victory will be a political defeat for Khamenei and Raisi. It will also erode Raisi's chances for replacing Khamenei as Iran's new Supreme Leader. Many expects have speculated that Kamenei wanted Raisi to win the presidency so that he will gain political legitimacy for becoming Kamenei's successor.
Neither of these two options are desirable for the Khamenei cape.
June 22, 2021: Raisi won the presidential election. Participation rate was 48% according to government officials. All branches of government are under the control of the Supreme Leader and his close allies. If a single team remains in charge and prevents factional feud the ruling regime can avoid fragmented governance and will be able to govern as a unified authoritarian regime. The deep differences between the preferences of the excluded majority and the ruling minority will remain in place and can pose new political challenges. The government must decide if it wants to change course to reduce the economic pressure (by making some compromises in foreign policy).